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Introdcution
"When a nation is without establishments and a military system, it is very difficult to
organize an army."1 Such was the observation of none other than one of history's greatest
generals and statesman, French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte. Napoleon's genius helped him
almost take over the whole of Europe, and, with some exceptions, he was one of the most
prepared commanders of his day. The importance of military preparedness has long been
recognized for success in war. The tactics and weapons have changed, but the concept has
remained the same, and no one prepares to fail; they fail to plan.
The United States did, at one time, declare war against the world's greatest superpower
and was utterly unprepared to fight it. We call that war the War of 1812. The war has often
been overlooked and understated, especially within the United States. Americans tend to ignore
the war, misunderstand it, or focus on aspects that occurred later, such as the Battle of New
Orleans and the Star-Spangled Banner's popularization. This view ignores many issues,
including that the United States was not prepared to go to war with Great Britain. By 1812
Britain had been at war, on and off, with France since 1793. Britain's army had been engaged in
the Iberian Peninsula since 1809, and the British military establishment was a well-oiled
machine. By comparison, the U.S. Army was tiny, poorly funded, and had not engaged a
conventional military force. Instead, they had been fighting wars of conquest along the frontier,
subjugating native peoples, and expanding the domain of an emerging republic.
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The United States had hoped to defeat Britain quickly in the War of 1812. American
leaders believed that a quick victory could not occur on the sea, where the war's causes had been
centered. Instead, they expected to have win the war by invading British holdings in modern-day
Canada. To some, British North America was a pipe dream for Americans who saw it as a
natural extension of the republic. Many Americans believed that Canada would be added to the
union in time, even at the time of the Revolution, and it would only take a slight push to do so.
In a letter to William Duane, American President Thomas Jefferson said that if they had to
invade the territory, "it will be a mere matter of marching," believing that the people living there
were oppressed and would happily revolt against their British overlords.2
This expansionist dream was never going to be realized. The United States Government
failed to grasp the determination of the people living in Canada to defend their homes and
underestimated the strength of the British forces stationed there. James Madison and his cabinet
overestimated the capabilities of their military forces. The War Department failed to prepare
adequate logistics and supply the armies that were put in the field. Military planners over-relied
on the state militia system and put too much trust in poor, inexperienced military leadership.
What was supposed to be a "matter of marching" turned into a parade of military disasters that
embarrassed the military hierarchy and ruined careers.
Three aspects explain why the United States could not achieve its war aims in the first
year of 1812. Chapter 1 will discuss different aspects of the American Supply system during the
war. It will examine the national-level problems and showcase the state of the American army
and its branches. Chapter 1 will also highlight specific supply shortages that affected the
campaign season of 1812 and how those factors contributed to American strategy failure.
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Chapter 2 will describe the United States Militia System. By explaining national issues
from state to state, the chapter will demonstrate how the militia was unprepared for war and
show the constitutional questions of sending militia into a foreign land. It also will examine the
militia units in the campaigns and how they held back American hopes for victory rather than
pushed it forward.
Lastly, Chapter 3 will examine the four American commanders in the field during the
first year of the war; William Hull, Stephen Van Rennsalaer, Alexander Smyth, and Henry
Dearborn. It will explain each general's campaign in a narrative style and analyze their
command decisions. The previous chapters will have painted the situation these commanders
were given, and the chapter will show how they were incapable of handling the military
conditions in the field. Chapter 3 will highlight these men's performances on the battlefield and
analyze each commander's overall performance.
Historians have long debated the pre-war state of the American military. One of the first
to look in-depth into the United States military was Theodore Roosevelt, in his book The Naval
War of 1812, written in 1882. Roosevelt's book was celebrated for its analysis of the American
navy during this period. Roosevelt tried to be as unbiased as possible and use the facts and
documents available to him. His honesty in the preface over the fact that he could not obtain
logbooks and reports regarding British ships shows an individual who was determined to analyze
the event as fairly as possible.3 While his work was primarily a focus on the U.S. Navy, he
touched on aspects of the American army, showing that it was ill-prepared and that many units
would flee at British regulars' "appearance."4 While his naval history seems to sit alone in this
historiographical analysis, it is essential to understand the trends. Roosevelt's book was unbiased.
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He tried to carefully analyze the facts of the war as he saw them rather than writing in a manner
that favored one side.
Other historians focused on the American Army. Edward M. Coffman's book The Old
Army: A portrait of the American Army in Peacetime 1784-1898 analyzed the army throughout
the late 18th and 19th centuries when the United States was not at war. This unique study looked
at the military between wars rather than during them as other histories have done. Coffman
examined a lengthy period noted in the title, with the War of 1812 falling into the timeframe.
The chapters cover long periods of peace between wars, often skipping the wars themselves and
only touching on innovations realized during the war. The book's first chapter, "That Perhaps a
Necessary Evil," covers the period from 1784-1812. He was very critical of Thomas Jefferson,
calling him "anti-military" and referred to the army in 1812 as a "frontier constabulary without
the means of planning or preparing for international conflict.5 Concerning this thesis, Coffman
sought to examine armies between wars. He pointed out that military historians tend to focus on
the wars rather than the armies between the wars. However, Coffman sought to know what
occurred between wars, who the soldiers were, and what armies were doing during these
peaceful times.6
Another military history is Amateurs, To Arms: A Military History of the War of 1812 by
John R. Elting. Elting's book covers the entirety of the War of 1812 from a military perspective
focusing on tactics and strategy. He examines everything from supply, logistics, and officers and
"bluntly" takes a close look at how all of these factors played out during the war.7 Elting's
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ruthless and straightforward analysis of Jefferson and the state of the army presents the reader
with certainty on the state of the army going into the war.
As mentioned earlier, the historians focused on large swaths of the war; some pursued
more specific lines of inquiry. William B. Skelton's book An American Profession of Arms: The
Army Officer Corps, 1784-1861, examined the history of the U.S. Army Officer Corps. Skelton's
analysis covers the Officer Corps from the end of the Revolution to the Civil War. While this
period is lengthy, he spent time examining the War of 1812. The book included statistical tables
on army officers' demographics, appointments, and parental occupations, among other subjects.
This study painted a picture of an American officer during the antebellum period and how the
army became a professional fighting force. He hoped to shed light on this aspect of military
history, something he says military historians have neglected.8 The book examined the officer
corps' internal history and the relationship between the civilian population and the officer corps'
evolution into a professional segment of the army.
The officer corps was not the only focus among historians. Many of them also examined
the state militias. One example was Lawrence Delbert Cress in his book Citizens in Arms: The
Army and the Militia in American Society to the War of 1812. His work delved into
philosophical aspects of the militia system dating back to colonial times and England. While his
work did not focus exclusively on the War of 1812, it did provide concrete context on the
subject. Most of the book focused on state militias before the war. However, he discussed it
briefly in chapter 10, but mostly from a policymaking perspective rather than a military history.
C. Edward Skeen's book Citizen Soldiers in the War of 1812 is one of the most scholarly
and authoritative books on the state militias. Skeen examined the militia throughout the war and
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the problems they faced constitutionally and on the battlefield. Skeen believed that the state
militias during the war were not adequately explored by other historians and thus needed a
comprehensive examination. He felt that part of the reason was that the amount of information
from state to state would be a "daunting" task. Because of this, he sought to limit his
examination to federal utilization rather than state by state accounts.9 His work has been
considered a standard by many historians seeking to understand better the state militia's in the
War of 1812.
Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski's text For the Common Defense: A Military History
of the United States from 1607 to 2012 is an in-depth analysis of American defense practices
dating from colonial times to the present. The goal of Millett and Maslowski's text was to
examine several factors in U.S. Military policy, including analysis into the relationships between
a standing army and a militia and civilian control of military policymaking. These themes are
essential when discussing the United States early in its military history. They studied these
themes up through the modern age, which helped showcase the state militia's development from
its earliest inception and the struggle of federal vs. state military policies.10
Histories involving the War Department are challenging to find. Often, books act as
catalogs to find primary sources such as John Fredricksen's The War of 1812 U.S. War
Department Correspondence, 1812-1815. Works such as this, however, do not provide historical
interpretation. A History of the War Department of the United States by Lurton Dunham
Ingersoll is one of the earliest attempts to write a history of the American War Department.
Written in 1879, this work covers the War Department from its inception to the 1870s. The text
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covers the overall War Department and the many smaller sub-departments that make up this
government branch. Ingersoll provides statistics and relied heavily on primary sources, which
helped immensely in the credibility.
While the War Department was necessary, so was the logistical aspect of armies. Charles
R. Shrader wrote United States Army Logistics, 1775-1992: An Anthology in 1997. He tried to
cover logistical elements supplying, equipping, and moving armies in his work. He was critical
and described, in detail, the logistical problems of each war through the Gulf War in 1991. He
also discussed the War Department's policy through the centuries and how each era treated its
army differently. The War of 1812 received similar treatment as Shrader stated that essential
lessons had not been learned after the war.11
In 1812, the Americans believed they could win a quick war against Great Britain and put
to rest the issues which started the war, and obtain a portion of land from British North America.
The idealist concepts of Democratic-Republicanism in the early 19th century in the potential of
citizen soldiers and a small standing army crushed their dreams. To accomplish their war aims,
namely major land victories in Canada and the capture of strategic points within Upper and
Lower Canada, they needed a military force willing to cross an international border with welltrained officers at the head and a supply train boot. However, the young republic did not have
any of these requirements. The question of the United States militias being able to cross into
Canada became a tide-turning factor in the campaigning season of 1812. The officers of the
United States were, in some cases, past their primes while others proved incompetent. The
supply system failed to feed, arm, and quickly move materials to the frontier posts in which these
battles took place. In short, the United States failed to achieve its war aims because of the
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factors mentioned earlier, and thusly caused the war to last longer than anyone in the federal
government had expected or wanted.

Chapter 1: The Supply System
All armies act as moving cities, and like cities, they need supplies in the form of food,
shelter, and clothing. An effective army needs an adequate supply and logistic system for it to be
successful. When supply systems fail, it leaves an army in a critical state that may prevent it
from performing efficiently. During the War of 1812, the American supply system was so bad
that it both seriously hindered field armies' effectiveness and cost American lives. In the first
year of the war, the supply system's breakdown prevented soldiers from getting much-needed
provisions and forced tactical decisions to be made that caused disaster or prevented a disaster
from getting worse.
In the years before the war, the Jefferson administration had emphasized private
contractors rather than government-operated suppliers. The avenue of private arms
manufacturing was already in some use before this time; however, the shift would be complete.
Jefferson did not close the armories at Springfield and Harpers Ferry; he left them in place but
shifted the focus away. Jefferson sought to have private industry compete for contracts for
muskets and cannons, thus driving the price down. Jefferson appointed Tench Coxe as Purveyor
of Public Supplies in 1803 and was given enormous power. Coxe could use up to one-third of
the war department's budget as he so chose without congressional oversight.12
With the emphasis on state militias, it became essential to make sure they were armed. In
1806, Congressman Joseph B. Varnum pointed out that half the state militias were not
adequately armed on paper. Coxe advised Jefferson to lean on private contractors to supply the
militia and refrain from importing imported munitions, which the Jeffersonian Republicans

Andrew J. B. Fagal “American Arms Manufacturing and the Onset of the War of 1812” The New England
Quarterly vol. 87 No. 3 (Sept., 2014), 531-533.
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believed would hurt domestic munitions manufacturing. Coxe managed to reduce the cost of
muskets down to $9.50 per firearm. After the Chesapeake affair and the United States began to
ramp up its military, Coxe worked with 17 domestic manufactures and allocated $100,000 in
startup funds to allow improvements to be made at different factories around the country, which
he hoped would maximize production.13
When the U.S. Government decided it would go to war with Britain in late 1811, they
realized that the U.S. Army would need expansion. After some debate, the House Foreign
Relations Committee's decision to expand the army was passed on December 16. The House
also passed a resolution allowing merchant ships to arm, a motion that even ardent Federalists
favored. The Senate passed a resolution calling for the expansion of the army. Specifically, they
wanted ten regiments of infantry, two regiments of artillery, and one cavalry regiment. The bill
called for each regiment to have 2,000 men each and full complement officers regardless if the
regiment's ranks had been filled or not. This action would raise an additional 25,000 men to the
U.S. Army's fighting strength, which was around 10,000 men on paper.14
Paying for the war was a matter that became one political theatrics. Wars are not cheap
by any measure, and funds needed to be raised to pay for the army's expansion and the military's
funding. Congress was in a fight over how to pay for everything. Bills before bot, including the
army expansion bill previously mentioned and a bill to build more frigates for the fledgling
Navy. Some Congressmen saw taxation as a problem easily remedied. William Widgery of
Maine said, "We are told, a war will be costly. Granted. What is money? What is all our
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property, compared with our honor and our liberty."15 Others were not so firm in their
commitment to the idea of leveling taxes. Fighting over the army and navy bills had become
bitter.
In a lengthy letter to Ezekiel Bacon of the Ways and Means Committee, the Treasury
Secretary, Albert Gallatin, explained the United States' difficult financial situation. The
government was not in a proper position for war. By Gallatin's estimates, the United States could
only hope to raise $2.5 million under its current financial structure. He encouraged the Ways
and Means Committee to consider an increase in duties to pay for the war. He proposed a duty
on alcohol, sugar, taxes on imports, stamps, among others. Gallatin expected to raise as much as
an additional $4.25 million by 1814 to pay for the war.16 The debate over the war cost put a
damper on the pro-war attitude and widened the political divide. War Hawks lambasted Gallatin
for being ridiculous, and some believed it was an attempt to kill the navy bill being discussed.17
Some in Congress's reactions could be described as sophomoric and naïve, considering that wars,
regardless of the reason, cost money, and it was not lost on Congress that the armed forces of the
United States were not in the best of shape for a full-scale war.
Part of the reason for Congress' reaction was the simple fact that the Republicans had
championed themselves in the name of smaller government. Since the Jefferson administration,
public debt had been reduced in half by expanding foreign trade interests. War with Britain
could cause that debt to balloon out of control. Therefore, many hoped for a quick victory to
avoid similar issues that had plagued the United States during the Revolution, such as massive
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inflation. Republicans felt that Gallatin's suggestions could destroy all they had built since
Jefferson, and there were fears of what would happen if they borrowed money through loans.
The loans would come from significant banks controlled by Federalists. Taxation was not a
popular option either. Not only had it been a rallying cry for the Revolution 37 years earlier, but
attempts at taxation had previously led to rebellions in 1786 and 1799. Federalists, opposed to
an offensive war in Canada, wanted funding spent on defense and a navy that infuriated
Republicans who feared it would encourage Britain to strike first and leave the country entirely
unprepared.18
On January 12, Congress officially authorized the Senate's recommendation, thus
expanding the army to 35,000 men. Northern representatives, most of whom were Federalists,
had argued against adopting the construction of a larger navy. As noted earlier, they felt that a
land war would make no sense and solve nothing in terms of Britain's grievances, which lay, in
part, at sea. However, Republicans refused over the sheer fruitlessness of such an attempt to take
on the Royal Navy. Their concerns were understandable and logical. The United Kingdom's
Royal Navy was enormous, with multiple stations around the world. The entire Royal Navy had
over a thousand warships with 102 ships-of-the-line with the North American fleet totaling
twenty-three frigates and three 74-gun ships of -the line. It had a reputation to match, having
destroyed Spain and Portugal's combined fleets at Trafalgar in 1805 and crushing the Danish
fleet.19
The U.S. Navy, on the other hand, consisted of five frigates active for service, seven
brigs, and sixty-two coastal gunboats that were in various and questionable conditions. The U.S.
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had 4,000 sailors to man all the vessels, and the Marine Corps only consisted of 1,800 men.
Leadership was also lacking as there was no one higher than a captain, and The Secretary of the
Navy, Paul Hamilton, was an alcoholic known to be drunk by noon most days. Despite his
disposition, he had wanted to create a 74-gun ship of the line and twenty frigates. However,
since Congress vetoed his requests, he was forced to repair five other frigates laid up and
desperate for overhaul. Congress had promised him an unspecified amount of lumber to be
delivered at an unspecified time to complete the job. The Federalists, who wanted a land war,
failed to consider that a naval presence would be needed on the Great Lakes to support their land
armies.20 This oversight would be a blow to significant supply and communication lines on Lake
Erie and Lake Ontario.
Armies during this period had three branches, which were artillery, cavalry, and infantry.
These branches all suffered serious supply issues during the war, and some of those supply issues
began before the war even started. Jefferson's military policies seriously hampered military
development despite reforming the officer's corps and manufacturing advancements. The fear of
standing armies going back to the Revolution also crippled development, which resulted in some
branches being less prepared than others. As the war went on, some of the branches became
outstanding. However, in the first year of the war, mismanagement, cost-cutting, and
government policy's general neglect seriously affected the army's branches' performances.
Artillery was one branch that was neglected, reformed, and neglected again. One man
who tried to reform the artillery was named Louis de Tousard. Tousard had left France because
of the French Revolution and joined the U.S. Corps of Artillerists and Engineers in 1795 as a
major. He pushed for reforms and wrote treatises that helped in the development of West Point.
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He also advocated for reform in the army's artillery and engineering arms that promoted French
ideas of uniformity. In 1809 he published The American Artillerist's Companion, a three-volume
book that significantly influenced the artillery system in the United States. The book was a hit,
and the U.S. Army adopted many of Tousard's ideas.21 Tousard's ideas were implemented but
were done so too late. Nevertheless, attempts to make the artillery a more reliable unit were
attempted. In 1808 the United States created the Regiment of Light Artillery, which was a model
of European style horse artillery which Tousard defined as:
The principal object of the horse or flying artillery is to possess such a peculiar
organization as to execute with facility not only the most rapid, but, at the same time,
the most unexpected movements; to be enabled quickly to bear either upon a point that
is attacked, on any part of a sea-coast which is threatened with invasion, or on a post
which it is requisite to carry a decisive attempt; to be constantly attendant on the
cavalry, if it be required; to confound and embarrass the enemy by every mode of attack
and defense, which the theory and practice of the military art, and of artillery, can
possibly suggest; and, lastly, to effect these various operations, by the knowledge of
displaying, positions, &c. &c. (sic)22
From a tactical standpoint, the appeal of horse artillery would make sense to the
American warfare concept to fend off an invasion. Congress authorized ten companies to be
fully furnished with horses, wagons, and cannons. However, Secretary of War Henry Dearborn
only organized one company. On October 25, 1808, Captain George Peter's artillery company
was demonstrated for the Army and Dearborn. With freshly painted carriages and brand-new
uniforms, the company was expected to move quickly from Baltimore to Washington and
occasionally stop to show off the guns. Despite this impressive sight, they were deemed too
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expensive to maintain. The draft animals were sold off in 1809, and the Light Artillery was to be
used in other capacities, including infantry.23
Cost-cutting played a factor in many ways, especially when it came to artillery. Dearborn
pushed to have American cannon made of iron rather than bronze because it was cheaper and
more robust.24 Dearborn saw this as the new way to make cannons and advocated for federal
arsenals at Washington, Pittsburg, and Watervliet in New York to cast-iron guns. Because of
Coxe and Jefferson's push to use private contractors, national arsenals made the guns and
carriages while the private contractors made the accouterments. Dearborn tried to modernize the
gun carriages to make them lighter, which would help with the heavier iron guns. When the new
Secretary of War, William Eustis, came into office in 1810 as part of Madison's incoming
administration, he asked for more bronze guns. These styles of guns had not been made since
1801. The confusion, coupled with reductions in production across the board, created supply
difficulties and resulted in shortages of cannon to artillery companies in the field. What guns
were available were not standardized with a combination of bronze and iron cannon and guns
that had been around since the revolutionary war. The artillery was now using the Gribeauval
system and the system used during the Revolutionary War, known as the John Muller System.

25

Because of the shortage, most artillery companies at the time of the war found themselves
fighting as infantry units, and there was a lack of qualified artillerists in the field. The United
States had no chief of artillery in Washington to manage the artillery arm despite Eustis' desire to

23

Richard V. Barbuto Long Range Guns, Close Quarter Combat: The Third United States Artillery Regiment in the
War of 1812, (Youngstown, New York: Old Fort Niagara Association, Inc, 2010), 7-8; Kevin F. Kiley Artillery of
the Napoleonic Wars: Field Artillery, 1792-1815 2d ed. (Barnsley, S. Yorkshire, U.K: Frontline Books, 2015) 101102.
24
Boyd L. Dastrup King of Battle: A Branch History of the U.S. Army’s Field Artillery (Fort Monroe, Virginia:
Office of the Command Historian, 1992), 47.
25
Donald E. Graves “Field Artillery of the War of 1812: Equipment, Organization, Tactics and Effectiveness”
Military Subjects: War of 1812 Magazine No. 12 Nov., 2009 https://www.napoleon-series.org/militaryinfo/Warof1812/2009/Issue12/c_Artillery.html: Boyd L, Ibid, 48-52.

7
appoint one. The one thing that was arguably an advancement in artillery technology was that
the army did not contract out drivers to move cannons and wagons. Instead, the army used the
artillerists themselves, the only nation in the Napoleonic period, to do so. The reason was
challenging because of advancement in theory or efficiency but rather to keep the cost down.26
The United States Cavalry was probably the most neglected branch of the entire army
during this period. Throughout the war, the United States had two regiments of light dragoons,
but they had a very checkered history. Dragoons are, traditionally, a type of cavalry unit within
the cavalry branch. Originally, dragoons were mounted infantry who rode to battle, dismounted,
and fought on foot. However, by the Napoleonic Wars, they had become used as heavy cavalry.
British cavalry, unlike mounted units in major European armies, was primarily made up of
dragoons. The U.S. Army possessed similar mounted units. However, that is where the
similarities ended. American cavalry units, especially in the western state militias, continued to
use their cavalry as mounted infantry, such as Kentucky rifleman on horseback, which
contributed significantly to the Northwest Indian War and the latter stages of the War of 1812.27
The United States had dragoons during the revolutionary war, but they were dissolved
after the war like most of the army. They reemerged as part of the Legion of the United States.
Six companies were planned in John Adams "New Army" with 60 men per company. When
Jefferson took office, and the army was reduced, the dragoons were abolished. The few men
they had been able to raise for the mounted units did not have horses and fought on foot. Six
years later, in 1808, with the expansion of the army came the addition of The Regiment of Light
Dragoons. The officers appear to have no formal qualifications, and the government refused to
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give the unit horses unless an actual conflict arose. Instead, they were armed and equipped as
and treated as a light infantry unit.28
In January of 1812, Congress authorized a second regiment called the 2nd Regiment of
Light Dragoons, thus renouncing the original regiment to the 1st regiment. Recruiters had a
challenging time recruiting soldiers for the unit. A colonel was not appointed until April 30.
Recruits who did join did not have formal clothing of any kind or equipment until September and
October. The unit did not receive all of its cloaks until the beginning of December. Horses were
ordered in March, but only half the unit had them by September, and most of the horses they did
receive were not fit for cavalry usage. The unit was scattered across the country, with one
company disappearing from War Department records.29
Both units lacked horses, and it became a chronic complaint during the first year of the
war. They also found themselves as dragoon units without carbines or shortened muskets. The
only carbines in existence within the United States Military were at the Military Academy.
Initially, they were used as gifts to Native Americans, but the frontiersman protested the practice.
Instead, they were kept in federal stores and only used by cadets who had nothing but disdain for
the weapons. Instead, the dragoons were armed with pistols made at Harpers Ferry and by
Simeon North. They were also armed with swords, as traditional cavalry and dragoon units
were, but the 2nd regiment had trouble acquiring them. Most of the regiment's blades came from
the manufacturer Nathan Starr, and the deliveries were slow and took months.30
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American infantry regiments fared better than their artillery and cavalry counterparts.
They were well-armed, thanks to American manufacturing, with 1795 Springfield muskets. The
1795 musket was a lighter and more accurate weapon than what the British were using.
However, it was a smaller caliber firearm firing a .69 caliber musket ball. The availability of
weapons for soldiers was only because American recruitments could not be met despite the
202,621 stands in arms, which could not handle both the regular army and the militia. By 1814
some 200,000 militia had been called out with an additional 25,000-38,000 men in the regular
army. Even with the armories and private manufacturing, the United States could only produce
about 90,000 muskets annually. The Commissary General of Ordinance, Decius Wadsworth,
estimated that by the end of the campaigning season in 1814, the American arsenals were
"exhausted." By comparison, the British government produced 2,673,366 muskets and pistols for
the British army between 1804 and 1815.31
The infantry had one rifle regiment that was raised in 1808. The attempt was to make the
Regiment of Riflemen an elite unit, and so they wore green uniforms with black facings rather
than the blue and red of other battalions in the army. The regiment was trained to act as a
frontier-style unit with training in skirmishing, ambushes, and other operations in North
America's forests. The Soldiers were equipped with the Harper's Ferry 1803 Rifle. Shorter than
the 1795 Musket, it was 33 inches long and fired a .54 caliber ball. Its first commander was
Colonel Alexander Smyth, who was "marginally effective" as the regiment commander.32
Going into the war, every facet of the army had some sort of supply issue, and the
problems would persist throughout the first year of the conflict. The bureaucratic structure to
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obtain supplies did not help the situation. The War Department had three smaller subdepartments to handle everything. The first was the Purchasing Department, usually referred to
as the Commissary Department. The man in charge, Commissary General Callender Irvine, was
responsible for purchasing all military supplies such as cannon, wagons, guns, clothing, and gun
powder. Once these were obtained, the orders were sent to the Ordinance Department. Being
established on May 14 of 1812, The Ordinance Department was the youngest of the three subdepartments. The first man in charge of the department, Colonel Decius Wadsworth, did not
accept his position until after the war was declared in June. He had an assistant Commissary
General of Ordinance and four deputies. Wadsworth and his underlings were given the task of
storing the equipment purchased by the Purchasing Department. It was left to the Secretary of
War to decide where the equipment was to go, in which case the supplies were transferred to the
Quartermaster's Department. A brigadier general oversaw the Quartermaster's Department along
with his four deputies. According to the Secretary of War, it was their responsibility to dispense
the supplies, sometimes using private contractors to deliver the forts' supplies.33
The system was confusing and difficult to navigate. The acquisition of supplies was
time-consuming and led to significant shortages, especially in the first year of the war.34
Confusion in Congressional legislation, which initially had the Commissary Department
purchase food and such for the armies, was confusing and resulted in severe delays. Eustis
persuaded Congress to write more specific legislation, but it was too late for the war's first year.
The Commissary Department was left to begging between other departments and government
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contractors to buy equipment and scrounge up whatever could be had. The departments were
short-staffed as well, making delays and shortages inevitable.35
The War Department divided the United States into 16 supply districts to make supplying
armies easier. Each district was contracted out to a private contractor to furnish food rations, but
no provision was made for an army invading foreign territory. The expectation was that private
citizens, who were not answerable to the troops or the War Department, were expected to feed
the army. The idea was to keep prices low, but that was not always the case, and supplies were
not always where an army needed them. No provision existed in federal policy that would
compel contractors to be near the army, and often payment was expected first before the army
could get the supplies. If the contractor failed to deliver, the commanding officers had to appoint
special commissaries to feed the army, which happened so much that the entire system was in
constant disarray. The system put the officers' responsibility if the contractor failed and took
away the officers' ability to plan on food rations.36
That responsibility sometimes resulted in profound consequences for the commander in
charge and the men's health under his command. Alexander Smyth was blamed by his men for
their plight in the region. After assuming the Niagara Frontier command, he found his army had
food problems, among other supply shortages, with the encroaching wintry weather. Smyth's
soldiers were sick due to the increasingly desperate weather conditions. Mutinies occurred
because the army lacked proper quarters, winter clothing, and adequate rations, and they laid the
blame squarely on Smyth. Half the regulars under Smyth's command were unfit for service due
to illness. Many had died, with five succumbing in 24 hours. The local newspaper, The Buffalo
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Gazette, reported that 24 men had been killed in the army field hospital and that the troops were
building a graveyard within their own camp's confines. "The measles have affected many,"
Smyth had written to his superiors, "and the want of salt meat, of ovens and exposure to cold…,
has produced dysenteries and other diseases."37 On its way back to Plattsburg on November 22,
Henry Dearborn's army was ordered to leave 134 barrels of flour and 54 barrels of bread for
troops stationed at Champlain's village. The decision to leave behind supplies may have added to
his army's privations in 1812 as many more were in Plattsburg.38
Nature could be deadlier than anything an opposing army may have had. Protection from
the elements was essential, and the first line of defense was a soldier's uniform. Coxe had tried
everything he could to acquire enough uniforms for the army but feared that he could not meet
the demands being made by the army's growing size on paper, and he needed to make
contingency plans. Since uniforms were issued based on seasons, such as summer and winter
uniforms, it seriously bogged down supply efforts with the army expanding in the spring of
1812. Uniforms were made of wool, and it became more challenging for the government to
obtain them, so Coxe decided to use Russian sheeting, hemp linen, and uniforms. The plan was
to furnish the older regiments first, then the newer ones. Coxe managed to get 5,000 tailors and
seamstresses to make the new uniforms, but when Congress reorganized the supply system, he
was pushed out of his job and replaced by Callendar Irvine.39 It did not help either that the
uniform regulations kept changing. Between 1808 and 1815, the U.S. Army went through five
different uniform standards. Some of this was due to supply issues that occurred throughout the
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war. Some of it was due to constant interference by the Secretary of War and the Commissary
General of Purchases. Uniforms in 1812-1813 needed to use other forms of cloth and color dye
due to shortages, which resulted in uniforms being brown, drab, gray, and blue. Some of the
infantry regiments had older uniforms that did not meet current regulations, while others had
newer, up-to-date uniforms.40
Dearborn's supply issues came mostly from the lack of protection from the elements.
Sickness forced his commanding officer, General Joseph Bloomfield, to stay behind. This, by
default, put Dearborn in field command. While he managed to march to the Lower Canadian
border without difficulty, his men did not have proper winter gear, or even tents began to weigh
heavily on him. 41 The militia was disbanded and sent home, but the regulars found themselves
without adequate winter quarters at Plattsburg. Bloomfield had never prepared dry, warm
quarters for them. Only a half-finished barracks under a cliff existed, which offered the men
some shelter. Log cabins, the traditional building for winter quarters, were not started until
November 28. During December, 100 men died from the cold, and Colonel Zebulon Pike
became seriously ill. Death from exposure was high all winter, and requests for additional
supplies from Washington were met with no answer. The only real covering the men had were
blankets that did not cover an entire soldier from head to toe.42
Even if supplies were ordered and ready for shipment, the road system was not ideal,
especially along the frontier. A lack of roads contributed to Generals Josiah Harmar's and Arthur
St. Clair's failures during the Northwest Indian War in the 1790s. "Mad" Anthony Wayne had to
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build his road in 1794, which helped in his victory at the Battle of Fallen Timbers. The War
Department realized the need for roads, but constitutional questions loomed over road
construction. While the Constitution mentioned the construction and maintenance of postal
roads, it said nothing about military roads. It took nearly 20 years before the question could be
resolved. Roads were built in the south connecting Nashville, Tennessee, and Natchez,
Mississippi, but the troops building it made it a post road. Later the roads were connected to
New Orleans in 1807. Congress appropriated $ 6,000 in 1811 for the construction of roads that
would lead through the Black Swamp, which lay near the edge of Lake Eire between Ohio and
Michigan Territory. It was almost two years before the plan was carried out, at least partially.43
Roads made situations difficult during the campaign. In the mid-western theatre during
the war's earliest stages, William Hull's army had to cut one through the Ohio wilderness, much
as Wayne had done 18 years earlier. The road was 200 miles long, from Urbana to Detroit. The
road was muddy, and the terrain incredibly difficult for both man and beast as the army's wagons
struggled through the notorious Black Swamp.44 Even after Hull's army had cut the road, a
supply column that marched on the road, less than a month later, had similar difficulties. Under a
militia captain named Brush, the supply column marched with "seventy pack-horses, each laden
with two hundred pounds of flour, in a bag, lashed on a pack-saddle; and a drove of about three
hundred beef cattle." The road was described as "impassable" by the column, especially in the
Black Swamp's vicinity. The men had to wade through water and push through thickets before
reaching the other side and encountering flat plains. Unlike Hull's advance, which was soaked
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with constant rain, Brush's column had no rain for two weeks, making the march easier but did
not help when a potable water shortage became an issue.45
Because of the road situation, water was often viewed as an essential manner to move
supplies quickly. The problem here, however, was control of the waterways. If a military force
did not have secure control of the lakes and navigable rivers, supplies could be open to attack
and fall into enemy hands. William Hull had the foresight to suggest as early as 1809 that
American warships be placed on Lake Erie. He wanted to ensure the lake was in the United
States' control to protect overland and water supply routes and communication. The request was
never met, and as noted earlier, Congress did not appropriate funds for naval expansion. As a
result, Hull had to march to Detroit, unsupported from Lake Erie.46 Dearborn had similar
thoughts and wanted control of Lake Champlain to prevent the British from launching an attack
on the United States and secure the flow of supplies as his army marched north in November.47
All branches and units had problems with food, clothing, and blankets. No reserve
supplies existed, and some regiments in late 1812 had shoes that were falling apart. In Fort
Detroit, Hull's men were now huddled inside with dwindling supplies in the form of rations and
blankets. Thomas Vercheres de Boucherville, writing years later about his time with Hull's
army, wrote that he could no longer stand inside one of the cabins. Instead, he went outside to
sleep but had no blanket. He instead "deprived" a man of his cloak and slept "in sound repose."
There was also a lack of "personal toilet articles" within the camp.48
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In New York, plans were formulated to ensure the Niagara and Champlain fronts' troops
were supplied. Governor Daniel D. Tompkins tried to get supplies to soldiers at the show by
writing to his generals and directing them to where stores were supposed to be. He would also
inform them that essential items like camp kettles, tents, knapsacks, and ammunition and arms
would be sent immediately, often attached to reinforcements. One such man in charge of
transporting supplies was Brigadier General William Wadsworth. He was informed of his new
role of ensuring troops were supplied and to move supplies to meet General Peter B. Porter, the
state's new quartermaster general in the Niagara region.49
Stephen Van Rennsalaer's army at Lewiston had received supplies, but it had not been
enough to sustain them. It became apparent to Porter, and he realized the gravity of the situation
as the preparations began to strain. Dearborn had left Greenbush for Boston to persuade the
uncooperative Federalist governors to commit their militias and went everything to Tompkins
and Porter. There were not enough blankets, tents, or camp kettles to supply the troops, and
there was an enormous lack of supplies to reinforce fortifications around the state. What little
tools were available for distribution could only be released on orders from Secretary Eustis in
Washington.50 Lack of control of Lake Ontario contributed to the supply problems, which forced
the supplies to travel overland. Despite New York's large quantity of military stores, there were
only 2,000 muskets and sixteen quarter casks of powder stored in arsenals west of Syracuse.
Commanders along the Niagara, such as Wadsworth, realized how poor the situation was.
Wadsworth wrote to Governor Tompkins, stating, "It is a cause of much regret that there are no
tent, camp kettles, or any description of camp equipage now in this quarter." His men did have
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plenty of flour but no way to bake it and make bread. The militia, who expected to have been
engaged in battle, began to seek weekend furloughs to go home and visit family. "there are not
ten rounds per man on the Niagara Frontier," one officer complained. The commanding officer at
Fort Niagara said, "We are literally starving on this end of the line, for bread."51
The supply shortage seriously damaged the Van Rennselear encampment, which led to
disobedience, impatience, and shooting across the riverbank. The crisis seems to have pushed
the already ill-discipline militia over the edge, and they began to show disrespect and grow
anxious over inaction. The stressed-out officers Solomon Van Rennsalaer and Porter also almost
came to blows over blame for the shortage of supplies. The two men almost started a duel over
the issue.52
Supply issues in warfare are more common than they should be. However, the United
States Army was unprepared to deal with the difficulties of a war with Britain. The lack of
adequate funding and an unnavigable supply structure at the national level, coupled with state
and local shortages, helped to undermine American success in the first year of the war. Had
better attention been paid to what it would take to wage war, the United States Army may have
been better equipped and more prepared to accomplish the goals laid before them.
Now that it has been established the strenuous difficulties faced by the U.S. military in
the supply sector, it can now be demonstrated how the composition of units in the field faced
philosophical, political, and regional tensions that undermined American success.
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Chapter 2: The State Militias
Militia played a vital role in the American Revolution, as well as conflicts in the Colonial
Period. In hindsight, it seems strange that the U.S. military would use such a system considering
its ineffectiveness in the first year of the war. The reason for this reliance comes from a tradition
of distrust of standing armies and a conviction that the citizen farmer would serve and protect the
republic. However, there were problems. The system that the United States government created
did not fit in with the overall plans for the Invasion of the Canadas. The militia was plagued
with distrust towards professional soldiers, the constitutionality of their usage, and overall lack
of discipline that threatened to undermine the invasion attempts.
The United States had a long tradition of distrust toward the concept of standing armies, a
view that was imported from English settlers.53 From a colonial standpoint, there were very few
examples of professional armies. Some colonies had hired professionals to organize their militia
before departing England. The Virginia Company hired Captain John Smith while the Pilgrims
hired the mercenary Miles Standish. However, these examples were few and far between.
Colonists were often on their own without help from England, and the military experts that were
hired were not equipped to deal with the style of warfare that existed in the new world. Armies
in Europe usually stood in lines yards apart on an open field, firing away at one another. By
contrast, in North America, fighting was often limited to small skirmishes in the forests, with
men hiding behind trees and rocks.54

53

Robert L. Heiss "The Professionalization of the American Army through the War of 1812" (M.A. thesis, SUNY,
Buffalo State, 2012)
https://digitalcommons.buffalostate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context=history_theses (accessed, 15,
February 2020), 11
54
Ibid, 14; David Freeman Hawke Everyday Life in Early America (New York; London; Toronto; Sydney: Harper
Publishing, 1988), 131-132.

1
Colonial militias were different from their European counterparts. Militia still came from the
local community, and officers typically came from a gentry class. Officers were chosen
differently, depending on the colony. New England elected theirs, while the colonies in the
Chesapeake states chose theirs through an appointment. Aside from those similarities, the
colonial militia was vastly different. All able-bodied males from 16 to 60 were incorporated into
the militia, and all men had a right to bear arms. Colonies were too poor to amass anything
resembling a European army. A militia made up of local citizens seemed to be the easiest way to
meet a colony's defense needs. The militia was also used as a policing force and to suppress
slave rebellions.55
At the end of the Revolution, a debate began over what to do with the Continental army
and whether it was constitutional to have a peacetime standing army. The debate over such a
force during the war had existed when the army was first created. However, there were fears that
the military could be used as a political tool for intervention. The creation of the Society of the
Cincinnati, a fraternal brotherhood of Washington's officers formulated by Henry Knox, seemed
to confirm this belief.56 In the meantime, Washington wanted a military that had four
components; a small regular army, a military academy for officers, an arsenal system for
supplies, and a universally trained and organized militia system. He wanted most soldiers to
guard the frontier, and the army expanded, emphasizing the militia to do the bulk of the fighting
in the opening days of a conflict. Congress, however, rejected it. Even when moderates
submitted their plan, which called for even fewer men, Congress snubbed it. Eventually,
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Congress settled on a program with 700 men divided into eight infantry battalions and two
artillery companies.57
Shay's Rebellion in the 1780s had called into question something proponents of a more
robust military had been advocating for quite some time. Massachusetts' militia had crushed the
rebellion only after the national government could not organize a force fast enough to meet the
uprising and prevent Springfield's arsenal from falling into the rebels' hands. The problems
experienced in the rebellion caused the delegates at the Constitutional Convention to implement
articles in the new Constitution to deal with these challenges. Article I, Section 8, paragraphs 15
and 16 gave Congress the power to call the militia to suppress rebellion or repel an invasion and
the "organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia" and gave the federal government the power
to appoint officers in case of a national emergency.58 This move with the Constitution became
important in future conflicts, including the War of 1812.
Some historians have called the new structure that appeared the "dual army" system.
Under the Constitution, states cannot, without Congress's consent, keep non-militia troops or
warships during peacetime, nor can they authorize privateers. States also could not engage in
war "unless invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay." However, they
could keep their militias. Article I, Section 8, coupled with the Second Amendment, established
a robust and decentralized emphasis on the militia.59 There had been discussions of a national
militia, but those ideas never came to fruition. Fears of an overly zealous and despotic central
government had managed to help preserve the historic state militias. However, many still
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believed that the federal power over state militias could lead to serious trouble because of "the
natural propensity of rulers to oppress the people." These same critics were firmly against the
existence of a standing army.60
The bulk of American defense would be on the militia system, which was rooted in the
distrust towards a standing army. Alexander Hamilton had been a proponent of a more robust
national army, yet in Federalist No. 29, he emphasized the importance of militia as a form of
national defense. Citing the fear of national standing armies, he pointed out that having a welltrained and disciplined militia, as described in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, was the
perfect solution to such fears. Since a standing army cannot be trusted, surely a militia could
be.61 Madison, one of the other writers of the Federalist Papers, wrote in Federalist No. 46 that
the European states did not trust their citizens to bear arms, but this was allowed in the United
States. The militia forces, he contended, offered "…the greatest assurance, that the throne of
every tyranny in Europe would be speedily overturned despite the legions which surround it."62
Therefore, the militia was considered essential in defense of liberty and individual rights if
threatened by an authoritarian government or foreign invasion. By the end of the Jefferson
administration, it had become an official policy that the militia would be the first line of defense
in the event of war. The federal government would allocate $200,000 to equip and arm militia
during the first throws of conflict.63
Distrust towards a standing army became apparent during the war. On several occasions,
the militia resented their professional counterparts. It was especially true between professional
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and militia officers. William Hull, a professional officer, had disagreements with his junior and
militia officers in the Detroit theatre during the earliest stages of the War of 1812. His militia
officers had no military experience, yet they were made colonels and threatened to disband their
regiments if reduced in rank. This forced Lt. Colonel James Miller of the 4th Infantry to become
subordinate to these militia officers despite his professional status. Miller was unhappy about
the decision but respected the decision.64 As the campaign progressed, the militia officers began
to discuss the removal of the General openly. Hull's paymaster for the Northwestern Army,
James Taylor, was summoned to Hull's tent to discuss its growing dissatisfaction. Hull accosted
him for not supporting the army more. Taylor informed him that other officers were unhappy as
well and that he was not responsible for it. The two men got into a heated argument that ended
with Taylor leaving the tent out of frustration. Taylor immediately sought out other officers to
find out where their opinions lay on the situation. The militia officers and Taylor were of like
minds. The men sent a letter to the governor of Ohio, Jonathan Meigs, asking for more than
2,000 men and adding a postscript that the General talked about capitulation.65 The conspirators
needed Hull's second in command, Colonel James Miller, to cooperate, which he did not. Thus,
the plot was abandoned.66
In New York, the situation was less of an officer mutiny and more of simple pettiness.
Alexander Smyth, a regular army officer, had such contempt for Major General Stephen Van
Rensselaer, a militia officer, that it prevented him from being a cooperative subordinate. He
considered Van Rennsalaer to be an "amateur," and he refused to even meet with him at the
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regular councils of war and set up his headquarters at Buffalo rather than Lewiston. This
pettiness deprived Van Rensselaer of 2,000 much-needed men.67 The night before the Battle of
Queenston Heights, Van Rensselaer had tried but failed to move his men into position to sortie
across the river, and Smyth had participated. However, the following day when Van Rensselaer
asked for Smyth's cooperation, Smyth refused. Instead, he wrote to Van Rensselaer earlier that
day, explaining that his men were exhausted and that some of his men did not even have proper
uniforms and would not receive them until October 13.68
The disagreements between the professionals and militias were only one of the persistent
issues that plagued American armies. The use of state militias outside their respective states and
the nation became a contentious constitutional debate. The origins of this debate began in
January of 1810 when President Madison asked Congress for reforms in which he also requested
100,000 militia and requested 20,000 to serve for a brief period. The concept became a debate
over whether militia could be used in an offensive war across Canada's border. Samuel Dana
raised objections to the proposal over how the militia was distributed. He sought to have the
militia quotas spread out by population rather than the old militia return system. Southern
representatives believed his proposal was biased against the southern states whose populations
were based on their slave populations. They pointed to western states where the populations had
increased. When the bill came back from the subcommittee to the House floor, a debate started
as to whether militia could be used outside the United States' borders. The constitutionality of
the concept was debated and doubted by some. As the debate continued, it was decided that the
militia constituted a military force but could not be used outside the United States unless they
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volunteered to cross a territorial boundary. By the end of April, The House passed the bill, and it
went to the Senate, but they postponed it and never took up the bill.69 It helped to contribute to
the failures of the United States' endeavors in the war. Armed with Jeffersonian philosophy and
the belief that militia could be the backbone of the American fighting forces, the U.S. stumbled
into war with Great Britain with a battle plan that reflected those beliefs.
By the War of 1812, the professional army was small, only about 6,744, at least on paper.
Nevertheless, only 5,087 could be accounted for. Secretary of War William Eustis believed this
was because the missing 1,657 soldiers had not yet arrived at their assigned units. As mentioned
previously, Congress had authorized raising an army to 35,000 men, but recruitment was slow
and disappointing.70 It was always expected the state militias would make up the bulk of U.S.
ground forces, but with regular army numbers being dismal, the militia would be expected to do
so much more. Mobilizing for the war was easier said than done. According to one report, the
state militias had 719,449 men officially on the militia rolls in 1812, but the intention was not to
call all of them out. Initially, in February of 1812, Madison asked for 30,000 volunteers, then
50,000, and finally, by April, Congress authorized 100,000 men, with each state expected to fill a
quota. The enlistments were initially expected to last three to six months.71
However, the constitutional debate never went away, and it haunted both the halls of
legislatures and the battlefields. As the American war machine began to power up, the war's
detractors, namely the Federalist strongholds in New England, began to give Henry Dearborn
and the War Department headaches. The New England states had been tasked with raising
20,000 men collectively. Connecticut Governor Roger Griswold had initially said that he would

69

Skeen, 13-15; Annals of Congress, 11th Cong., 2d sess (House), 1381-1382.
Marvin A. Kreidberg, Merton G. Henry History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army: 1775-1945
(Department of the Army: November 1955), 46.
71
American State Papers: Military Affairs 12: 332, Militia report February 1813 on 1812; Latimer, 56-57.
70

7
be willing to execute orders "without delay" had General Dearborn requested troops. However,
on June 22, when Dearborn asked two infantry companies and two artillery companies to defend
coastal areas, Griswold refused. He claimed that the federal government could not "place any
portion of the militia under the command of a continental officer."72 Griswold's Council of State
said no conditions had been met to place the militia under federal officers' command. Secretary
of War Eustis responded, telling Griswold that this order was coming from President Madison
with great urgency and that Dearborn's requests should be met. The Council and Governor were
steadfast. If Connecticut was not being invaded, they contended, the militia would not be called
out and would remain absent from Dearborn's command until the Constitutional requirements
were met. The state legislature argued it was an offensive war and not a defensive war and
refused to contribute.73
Connecticut was not the only state that played the constitution card. Governor Caleb
Strong of Massachusetts refused the 41 companies he had been tasked with raising. While he did
not put up the same effort as Griswold did, the arguments were the same. As Eustis encouraged
Strong the same way he did with Griswold, Strong summoned his council, which promptly
refused the requests. Griswold and his council asked the Massachusetts State Supreme Court to
see if the militia activation circumstances were constitutional. The court said the governor was
within his rights, and no one could command the militia except for a Massachusetts officer.74
The State of Rhode Island went a different route. Rather than refuse outright, they tried
to negotiate. The Governor, William Jones, was concerned that the state was losing military
assistance by sending its militia out of state. Jones demanded the federal government give it the
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arms that had been requested in 1808 but had never been received. Jones also consulted his
Council of War, which found the conditions met but left the governor's decision, unlike
Connecticut and Massachusetts.75
The debate persisted and impacted the armies on campaign. Almost every army had to
deal with the constitutionality of militia use in a foreign invasion. When the militia under Hull's
command arrived at the border, 188 of them refused to cross the Detroit River and stayed on the
American side. The company captain was immediately court-martialed, but his men quickly
reelected him and again refused to cross.76

Constitutional questions also plagued Van

Rennsalaer's army at Queenston. During the battle, Brigadier General William Wadsworth, a
militia officer, had hoped that since all the regulars were engaged in Queenston, the militia
would see him cross the Niagara River and follow him. However, they refused. Earlier in the
battle, Solomon Van Rensselaer had ordered Major John Morrison to follow John Chrystie's 13th
infantry. However, he dithered and eventually disappeared from the action. His men began to
"second guess their commitment" and refused to cross, claiming that they had no legal obligation
to cross into a foreign land and away from their home state.77
The sounds and sights of battle did not help the morale of the untested militia either.
Hearing the sounds of battle raging across the river and seeing the dead and dying being brought
back in boats cracked some of the militia's fragile mindset.78 In his report, Van Rensselaer wrote
that potentially a third of the men who refused to cross could have tipped the battle in American
favor. The Weekly Register expressed similar frustration saying, "They were wretches who at
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this critical moment could talk of the constitution (sic), and the right of the militia to refuse to
cross the line!"79
The flat-out refusal on constitutional grounds results from a larger problem within the
ranks of militia units. The state militias were never meant to be full-time soldiers. Unlike militia,
professionals, sometimes called federal troops or regulars, was a volunteer force. An officer
would venture into an area with a sergeant or corporal and a couple of musicians to add some
flair; in the peacetime army, potential recruits needed to be about 5' 6" minimum and required to
be at least 18 to enlist, although some as young as 16 could sign-on. Most men during the war
were between 18 and 45. Soldiers who decided to enlist could expect about $12-16 signing
bounty, clothing and expected to be issued one ¼ pounds of beef, 18 ounces of bread, a gill of
liquor, salt, vinegar, and soap, and a small candle. Soldiers could expect to make as much as
$8.00, sometimes paid upfront for three months' service.80
Unfortunately, the army had no official standard for training. The best they could hope in
terms of anything formal was Baron von Steuben's Regulations for the Order and Discipline of
the United States' Troops or what merely was popularly known as the "Blue Book." It was
written during the Revolution in 1779 for the fledgling Continental Army and was still the
unofficial standard by the War of 1812.81 As a result, some soldiers were trained with whatever
the commanding officer deemed necessary, and drill times could vary. This left the army with
different discipline and training degrees that changed with the officers who commanded them.82
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Nevertheless, even with these flaws, their training was still considered better than that of the
state militias.
By contrast, militias were supposed to require all able-bodied men in a state to serve,
typically requiring commitments from adults ages 16-45. However, that was not universal.
Some states had slightly different draft ages.83 Many states opted to divide their militia units into
"divisions" based on geographic locations. Governors and the Attorneys General would appoint
militia generals to oversee training in each division, like regular army officers. Most of these
generals were unpaid, but the position carried great prestige that could lead to public office later
in life. Most states' militia systems were based on a local company from towns and villages
being the backbone of most militia battalions.84 The chief difficulty was whether the men in the
militia would appear for their training. Soldiers would sometimes fall through the cracks and
never report to duty or try everything they could to avoid it. States tried to enforce laws
requiring men to appear for militia duty, such as fines and jail time. A man could hire a
substitute for an average of $20 a month. Kentucky allowed substitutes for $100 per 6 months,
and New Jersey allowed $50 substitutes for an unspecified period. Despite these attempts, it still
did not stop the tide of absenteeism.85
Like their professional counterparts, the states offered militiamen a fee for their service to
boost participation. States also provided incentives such as signing bounties. If a militiaman had
his blanket in Massachusetts, he could expect to earn an extra $3.75 a month. Vermont would
provide an additional $3.34 a month, while New Hampshire offered a $2 bonus plus an extra
ration. New Jersey paid $3 more than allowed by the U.S. government, and Pennsylvania paid
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$10 for privates, $11 for corporals, and $12 for sergeants. Some soldiers in federal service were
also granted land bounties. In one pension record, Joel Hall, a private in the New York Militia
acting in federal service, was given a land bounty of 80 acres. States also tried to extend their
service with larger bounties. Pennsylvania and Ohio offered as much as $12 who volunteered an
additional two months of service, while Kentucky only authorized $8.86 Despite all of these
attempts to boost participation, the states could not maintain nor meet the federal government's
quotas.
Like the federal government, the states were in serious trouble with militia supplies and
personnel. For instance, Delaware had no militia system to speak of before the war due to a law
that abolished all fines and missing drills. Southern states like North Carolina had a militia
system that was so worn that the system had to be put together essentially from scratch. Many
states had militia unarmed and did not have necessary supplies for their militia, such as blankets,
tents, and gunpowder. Out of Georgia's 1,000 stands of muskets, half were "hardly fit for
service." Some militia soldiers were apathetic and lacked confidence in themselves and the
ventures they were being asked to do. Maryland law allowed a quartermaster general to organize
supplies, but the position had to be served with no pay. Kentucky's regiments were small, but
they managed to raise 11,114 men in 1812. However, most of their troops remained with
William Henry Harrison and would not contribute to Hull's campaign or the west until 1813.87
Not all were in such rough shape. The State of New York, which would be the staging
ground for three of the attacks in 1812, was in a decent position militarily. On paper, the state
boasted that its rolls totaled 102,068 men. Those men were divided into five divisions, each led
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by a Major General. The state also claimed to have "95 pieces of brass field ordinance,
completely mounted and fit for service…" and an additional 153 cannon of various calibers and
8,409 stands of small-arms, all of which belonged to the State of New York.88
With the states lacking adequate organization, and the relaxed attitude of disciplinary
measures towards absent soldiers, the conditions were perfect for ill-discipline to run rampant.
Aside from the militia officers threatening to mutiny or disband their regiments in Hull's army,
Hull also had problems with a militia company that refused to continue work on cutting the road
from Urbana to Detroit until they were paid. The situation might have become more complicated
if Miller's 4th infantry had not "pricked" them up and kept the militia moving.89
Refusing to work was just one of the signs of ill-discipline. Some militiamen were
content to simply ignore orders and had a challenging time adjusting to military life. Van
Rensselaer and his Federalist commanders had more trouble with their militia units than Hull
had. As previously mentioned, they had tried to establish "a model Federalist society," where the
soldiers were supposed to look at their superiors as paternal protectors, and discipline was
supposed to be a staple of the Van Rensselaer encampment. A typical day started with reveille at
daybreak. From there, all officers and men were to form on the parade ground for drill. Officers
would drill their men under the guidance and observation of General Van Rennsalaer and his
senior staff.
At 4 PM, the second hour of drill would take place. Tuesdays and Fridays, the
encampment would participate in the full battalion. Soldiers were expected "to be clean and
their arms and accouterments bright and in perfect order…"90 During the day, cleanliness was
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made a priority. Officers were ordered to expect their men's tents daily and ensure they were
adequately aired out. About 200 yards behind each companies tent, the ground was to be
leveled, and two sinks were dug in this area for toilets. Soldiers had strict orders that anyone
caught "defiling" the camp would be seriously punished. At 9 PM, the entire camp would be
expected to go to bed for the night, apart from 160 guards who would guard the camp. Guards
were on a rotary schedule from company to company. It was not a popular duty, so soldiers were
encouraged to fire their muskets at a target about 100 yards away. The best shot received a quart
of whiskey while second and third place earned a pint and a half pint, respectively. John Lovett
wrote to a friend admiring, "The order, the decency, the patience, sobriety & indeed discipline of
the troops here." He also said the soldiers were as "dutiful as children."91
Despite the regimented day and John Lovett's writings, nothing could have been further
from the truth. The soldiers had not paid and lacked blankets; the men insulted their officers,
soldiers became drunk and failed to perform duties, and shot their muskets into the air recklessly.
John R. Fenwick admitted, "Our Guard-room is full of prisoners- some for mutiny-others for
desertion." Part of the problem was the militia were not used to army life and the high
organization being attempted by Van Rennsalaer. The weather did not help matters either, as it
was sweltering and humid, coupled with rain and thunderstorms. Soldiers became exhausted and
bored and randomly shot across the river against orders, which led to a British militiaman's
death, the Niagara frontier's first casualty. The incident enraged Van Rennsalaer because it went
against everything he was trying to do and led to formal complaints from the gentlemanly
officers on the British side of the Niagara River. Van Rennsalaer ordered his officers to sleep
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with their men and among the ranks to allow a quick response to misconduct. Not all men
arrived on time for reveille, and one night, a guard let a prisoner escape.92
Alexander Smyth inherited Van Rennsalaer's command and, with it, many of the
problems. Smyth did not help matters with his attitude. Smyth wanted more regulars because he
had no faith in the militia. On November 1, a mutiny broke out amongst the militia. One
hundred men stacked their arms and walked off while another 100 stacked them and stood near
them. After much persuasion, the remainder of the unit was consolidated with another one. Four
men were shot for desertion and one for mutiny over the ordeal. Captain John Philips was courtmartialed on charges of "Violating the 8th article of the rules and articles of war" and "neglect of
duty." He was found not guilty on all charges. However, to try and re-establish order, Smyth
stated that "an officer present at a mutiny, who never draws his sword and uses only words,
cannot be said to use his utmost endeavors to suppress it." Brigadier General Daniel Miller and
several other officers could not be trusted to continue their command and were subsequently
dismissed. The brigade in question was broken up and consolidated into other units. 93 On
November 9, more troops mutinied. Two regiments at Utica and another near Syracuse and one
volunteer company around Buffalo went home over what they claimed as a failure to receive
pay. Another unit near Buffalo threatened to mutiny if they were not paid or received clothing.
2,000 troops from Pennsylvania were supposed to have arrived in August and did not make it to
Buffalo until September. By November, there were concerns about their loyalties. Smyth asked
them how many would cross, and Brigadier General Adamson Tannehill replied only 413.94
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There were some 7,000 men in the area in and around Buffalo, most of whom were
militia. However, much to General Smyth's frustration, he could only muster up 1,500 men to
assault Canada on both of his invasions, nearly half of what Dearborn had wanted Smyth to use
in his forays. Disgusted with the conditions they were serving in and Smyth's inaction, the militia
to mutiny further. After Smyth expressed his frustration at the militia and insulted them behind
their back, a handful of militiamen threatened Smyth's life, firing shots at him and offering $200
for his person.95 The men in Buffalo were growing increasingly hostile to not only their officers
but civilians too. A man identified as Mr. Pomeroy, a hotel owner and respected member of the
Buffalo community, became embroiled in a heated dispute with militia from Baltimore, the
company of Irish Greens, and several other soldiers over his Federalist viewpoints. On
November 25, a mob of 40 or so militiamen rioted and attacked Pomeroy's hotel, breaking
furniture and setting fire to the hotel several times while the fearful citizens quickly put it out. An
artillery company was brought in to try and clear the hotel. Two men were killed. Others went to
retrieve their weapons to assault the artillery company but were persuaded otherwise by their
officers losing control of their men. The company had to be put under guard to prevent further
attacks. 300 Regulars were assigned to guard the village of Buffalo from the furious
militiamen.96
After Smyth canceled any further invasions, 600 men from Pennsylvania deserted in 24
hours over discontent with their conditions. They were still living in tents despite the wintry
weather and more left in droves over the next few days. General Tannehill told Smyth that
many of the officers had gone with the deserters and would be better to dismiss the remaining
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men. He felt that staying any longer would amount to the same amount of “evil” that had
already occurred Smyth’s command. Tannehill estimated his remaining force to be about 267
privates with an unknown number of officers, noncommissioned officers, and musicians.
Frustrated, Smyth reorganized Tannehill’s battalion's remnants, turned it into one battalion under
one of the remaining majors, and dismissed Tannehill from his command. Smyth decided to
disband the unit two weeks after he had reorganized it.97
The idea that state militias would be the defenders of the republic and be used as an
invasion force was a severe misjudgment by the commanders who planned to utilize them. Not
only were there constitutional questions over whether they could be deployed in a foreign land,
but the militiamen proved to be notoriously unreliable in battle. They were ill-disciplined, prone
to mutinies, and lacked understanding of how a military should work. While they may have
performed better as a defensive or support unit, the use of militia as a primary military force did
nothing but contribute to the mathematics of defeat. For the most part, their opponents were
seasoned British regulars who were much better trained and supplied. Perhaps these deficiencies
facing the Americans might have been overcome had the armies’ commanders been better suited
to their roles. As the next chapter will explain, however, the problems that ran through
American forces reached the top and exposed their field commanders' weaknesses.
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Chapter 3: Commanding Officers
As we have seen, the United States Government and the U.S. Army were facing difficult
challenges. Between a confusing and unreliable supply system and a broken militia system, the
officers in charge would have a challenging time with their armies on the battlefield. Napoleon
once said, "Generals-in-chief must be guided by their own experience or their genius."98
Unfortunately, the commanders did not fit this description. They were held back by indecision,
age, infirmity, and inexperience. In terms of indecision, it is a theme that will present itself
numerous times for various reasons and covers all four generals.
Age has a way of seriously affecting individuals and even experienced generals. William
Hull and Henry Dearborn were two such men whose age and mental acuity affected their
performances on the battlefield. Both men had exemplary records in the Revolutionary War and
later in politics. Hull had fought at some of the Revolutionary War's most important battles and
saw some of the bloodiest engagements. He earned praise for bold military action and ingenuity.
After the war, he became Governor of Michigan territory, which he still held as the war
approached. Dearborn had served "Conspicuously" in the Revolution. Later, he became a
politician, served as Secretary of War, and oversaw changes in the War Department, as seen in
Chapter One.99
By 1812, both men were in their 60s, and neither were interested in commanding a field
army. Hull had never wanted to take command of an army. Instead, he had traveled to
Washington because of his deeply held concern about an unchecked native population and
British naval supremacy on Lake Erie. He encouraged Secretary Eustis to strengthen Lake Erie's
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naval presence and was promised both a naval presence and reinforcements once he reached
Ohio. The naval force never came. During the discussions, the plan formulated for Canada's
invasion was conceived, with Detroit becoming a significant focal point and staging area. As the
discussions continued, it became apparent that President Madison needed field commanders. To
this end, Hull was asked to take command of what would become the Army of the Northwest.
Hull initially refused. He had no desire to start a new military career, preferring to remain in his
current position. However, he was pressed on the issue, and he finally relented, accepting an
appointment as a brigadier general.100
Dearborn was also unenthusiastic about taking command, and it was noticeable to
everyone around him. The British minister to the United States described him as a "heavy,
unwieldy looking man… He has apparently accepted his appointment with great reluctance,
having hesitated till within a few days, his military reputation does not stand very high."101
Dearborn was made Major General and placed in command of an area that stretched from the
Niagara River to the New England coast. He had, however, become: "Insecure, fat, slow, and
accident prone." The President's wife, Dolly Madison, once reported that Dearborn: "had a fall
which, tho (sic) not serious, confines him [t]o his house." 102
In April, Dearborn presented the plans for his campaign. He agreed with John
Armstrong's advice to Eustis to capture Montreal, the lynchpin between Quebec and Canada's
western parts. He believed that capturing the city would leave: "Kingston, York, Fort George,
Fort Erie, and Malden, cut off from their common base must (sic) soon and necessarily fall."103
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He also believed that the operation should be done with the regular army rather than the militia,
which he could use as diversions. These diversions would put pressure on the British to keep
their garrisons in their respective forts.104
Dearborn's plan differed in that he sought to use the militia more aggressively. He
wanted to use the militia as a diversion by crossing into Canada at critical points along the St
Lawrence River. Dearborn would march north along Lake Champlain, following the path that
John Burgoyne had used to invade New York in 1777. Dearborn would then capture Montreal.
He intended to use supporting attacks from Sacketts Harbor on Lake Ontario and Niagara
Frontier to support this move. The northern front scale meant that Dearborn was left in charge of
an area that stretched from Boston, Massachusetts to Buffalo, New York. Dearborn departed to
Albany, where he was expected to direct Montreal's attack and set up headquarters in mid-May
near Greenbush, New York. Hull left Washington around the same time and traveled to
Baltimore and then Cincinnati, then to Urbana. 105
His command was one of the diversionary actions devised by Armstrong and Dearborn.
Hull's army was mostly militia with a company from the United States 4th Regiment of Infantry,
totaling about 1,500 men. Hull had to cut a road 200 miles long from Urbana to Detroit to allow
supplies through the wilderness. When he arrived at the Maumee River on June 30, he made his
first grave mistake. Hull had supplies and other material loaded onto the ship Cuyahoga; only
the ship was captured a couple of days later. Onboard was Hull's personal war correspondence,
and it was now in the hands of the British. 106
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Hull’s age may have made him more trustworthy than he should have been. Hull seemed
to have forgotten his concerns in Washington over naval supremacy on Lake Erie. Not only had
the government failed to come through on its promise to put ships on Lake Erie, but no funds had
been allocated. Hull also decided to use an unarmed merchant vessel rather than a military
escort. Only a handful of officers were put on the ship, and no serious attempt was made to arm
the ship. The British captured everyone on board, including several women and boys. Some of
the officer's baggage was sent back to Detroit, but the rest was kept as spoils. The officers
became prisoners of war.107 Hull also failed to take proper security precautions by not
blindfolding a British officer who came to discuss prisoner exchanges.108 Despite being ordered
to take Fort Malden, he remained cautious and did not encourage his officers to remain
offensive. 109 He deferred to his junior officers on a strategic bridge that they destroyed instead
of capturing it.110 The decision took strategic Fort Malden off the table. The fort had a shipyard,
and its loss would have been a blow to British naval operations on Lake Erie. 111
It was at this point that Hull's command was beginning to unravel. His junior officers
challenged his fitness, as mentioned in Chapter 2. Hull became increasingly panicked and
dithered in Canada. He issued orders and then took days to act on them. At councils of war, his
officers demanded action on a supply column en route commanded by a Captain Brush and a
move against Fort Malden. Hull, however, stalled. Eventually, he pulled back across the Detroit
River to Detroit and, after several days, sent men to retrieve Captain Brush twice, but both
expeditions failed.
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His third attempt was out of step with his belief that he was outnumbered by British and
Native forces encroaching around him. Despite seeing British troops across the river, preparing
to cross, he refused to open fire on them, giving the British plenty of time to cross and take up
positions against the fort. On August 15, despite telling General Isaac Brock that he was: "ready
to meet any force which may be at your [Brock] (sic) disposal," he surrendered after a
cannonball killed four junior officers in Hull's mess.112
Hull was tried for treason, neglect of duty, and "un officer like" conduct, as previously
mentioned. He was found guilty on all charges except for treason and sentenced to death, but his
revolutionary war record caused President Madison to commute his sentence.113 Hull's failure
could be attributed ultimately to his age and decline in mental acuity. He was not the man he
was in the Revolution, and his hesitation in taking command may have shown that Hull had
realized that himself. He had panicked in the face of adversity instead of rising to it and
contradicted his orders before even his junior officers began questioning his command.
Dearborn had more severe health problems. As previously mentioned, he was
unenthusiastic to go, suffered from accidents, and was physically unfit. Nevertheless, he went to
war. As mentioned in Chapter Two, the states of Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island
refused to allow their militias to be activated for federal service. Dearborn, desperate for troops,
sought only the regulars from the New England states, which left the coasts open to British raids.
Dearborn struggled to raise enough men to launch an offensive into Canada. Morgan Lewis, his
second in command, said: "We have as yet but the shadow of a regular force- inferior, even in
numbers, to half of what the Enemy (sic) has already in the field."114 Relief came to Dearborn in
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the form of an armistice. On August 9, Sir George Prevost, the Governor-in-Chief of British
North America, had sent a Colonel Edward Baynes to negotiate. Prevost had learned that Britain
had repealed the Orders in Council, a piece of legislation that contributed to America's
deceleration declaration of war, and wanted to give the U.S. Government time to respond.
Baynes was a military professional and was disgusted by the state of the American camp at
Greenbush. He described it as: "…the greatest contempt and repugnance to the restraint &
discipline of a military life." 115 Dearborn quickly accepted the armistice to prepare his troops
better. However, he also had no desire to make an offensive. Dearborn had expressed that he
hoped he could retire indiscreetly. Baynes concluded that Dearborn lacked: "…the energy of
mind or activity of body requisite for the important station he fills." Madison rejected Prevost's
armistice, and hostilities were resumed by September.116
Dearborn showed that he was exhausted, and his desire to command was lacking. It was
made apparent by Baynes's observations of the camp as being disorganized and ill-disciplined.
Dearborn appeared to neglect his plans to coordinate with the other fronts. The plan was
convoluted considering 19th-century technology, but with an unambitious commander, the task
was made insurmountable. Despite this, Dearborn still planned to launch an assault on Montreal.
He recognized that control of the waterways was necessary for his campaign to allow supplies to
flow smoothly. However, the river that would be needed to supply his army did not flow close
enough to Montreal. As a result, the decision was made to march directly against Montreal
overland. Control of Lake Champlain would prevent the British from launching an attack on the
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United States and secure the flow of supplies to support the army until it turned overland.
However, no such naval force existed.117
Dearborn's plan included using Plattsburg, New York, which sat on Lake Champlain, a
staging area for the "Northern Army" invasion. His situation there, however, was precarious at
best. He was forced to send troops to the Niagara theater, and there were serious concerns about
the powder magazines at the Plattsburg encampment. Governor Daniel D. Tompkins of New
York had sent 800 militia to Major General Benjamin Mooers at Plattsburgh. Dearborn wanted
to amass a total of 10,000 men to cut of Quebec. However, Dearborn expressed his doubts about
the situation: "…but whether I shall be able to effect (sic) anything or not,… depends on so
many contingencies, as to leave all in doubt." He assigned General Joseph Bloomfield, who left
for Plattsburgh on September 2, to command the forces directly.118
After two months, Dearborn resolved to visit the camp at Plattsburg to evaluate whether
the conditions would be acceptable for an advance. In another sign of his age, severe rheumatism
delayed his departure, but he finally left on November 8. While in route, he wrote: "I trust
General Bloomfield will be able to move toward Montreal, and with the addition of three
thousand regular troops that place might be arrived and held this winter: but I cannot consent to
crossing the St. Lawrence with an uncertainty of being able to remain there."119 Upon his arrival
on November 19, he found that Bloomfield was too ill and unable to command his men. The
army had 3,500 regulars, 2,500 militia, and near the U.S.-Lower Canada border. He also learned
that the enemy had between 1,000 to 1,500 regulars, 1,500 to 1,800 militia, and 300 native
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warriors. Dearborn had not wanted to take direct command, but he was forced to do so with
Bloomfield confined to bed.120
On November 20, a small contingent of American troops crossed into Canada and
engaged French Canadian militia at Lacolle mill. After a brief engagement that resulted in
friendly fire casualties, they fell back. The Battle of Lacolle Mill was the only engagement of
Dearborn's advance towards Montreal in 1812.121 Meanwhile, Dearborn's army marched back to
Plattsburg and Greenbush for what became a miserable winter. Dearborn gave up on his invasion
and took the failure personally. Humbled enough over the fiasco and realizing his physical
limitations, he offered his position to anyone who would take it in a letter to Secretary of War
William Eustis. Despite what Dearborn or others had witnessed over the last several months,
Eustis kept Dearborn in command.122 Dearborn's failure resulted from his insecurities and
consistent delays, either by his lack of motivation or physical ailments. The Montreal campaign
was supposed to be the main attack and proved uneventful compared to the diversions he
planned at Detroit or Queenston Heights. Dearborn's legacy is one of timidity, lethargy, and
experienced commanders who were past their prime.
While Hull and Dearborn were experienced commanders who were no longer competent
to do their jobs, Stephen Van Rennsalaer and Alexander Smyth, the Niagara Frontier
commanders, were younger but had no experience. Both men were politicians by trade and
earned their positions by appointment. Van Rennsalaer had a lengthy political resume and was

120

Quimby, 81-82; Berton, 263.
Maass, 94.
122
Quimby, 83-84
121

8
poised to become the next Governor of New York. In contrast, Smyth had served in Congress
before being appointed by President Jefferson to the Regiment of Rifles.123
Stephen Van Rennsalaer was appointed to major-general not out of admiration but due to
politics. Governor Tompkins of New York was a savvy politician and a diehard Republican and
saw the war as an opportunity. He persuaded the Madison administration to appoint Van
Rennsalaer, a strong anti-war federalist, to become commander-and-chief of the New York State
Militia in June. It is believed the appointment was a gamble by Tompkins to discredit Van
Rennsalaer. If he refused to go, he would be viewed as unpatriotic and could be smeared in the
election. If he did go, he would be viewed as a traitor to his fellow Federalists. 124
Van Rennsalaer accepted the post but insisted he be allowed to choose his staff. He was
given permission and chose men, including Solomon Van Rensselaer, Stephen's hyper-partisan
cousin, who said of the war: "If nothing is done, it will not be our fault but that of the
Government." The general also picked his friend John Lovett who, like his other Federalist
comrades, decried the war and called it: "the deformed, rickety offspring of Mars begotten, in a
drunken frolic in the stews, with the hag strumpet democracy."125 Like Stephen Van Rensselaer,
Lovett had no military experience. He was a graduate of Yale, served in the state assembly, and
served as a clerk to the Albany Common Council before becoming Stephen's military secretary.
On the other hand, Solomon Van Rennsalaer had seen experience with the Regiment of Light
Dragoons from 1792-1800 and had been wounded at the Battle of Fallen Timbers. Solomon's
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experience could be invaluable to a man who has been described as a: "strictly amateur
general."126
As previously mentioned in Chapter 2, the commanders established a "model federalist
society" and were marginally successful. Despite the soldiers being unaccustomed to military
life, the Van Rennsalaers were respected by most accounts. Stephen would camp with the
soldiers and mingle with them, a sound strategy to boost morale and a trick he probably learned
from so many years in politics. Despite his reported strictness in discipline, he showed great care
for the men under his command. On one occasion, when a soldier collapsed on the parade
ground, Stephen ordered a nearby man to go to his tent and retrieve a tumbler of wine for the
fallen comrade in the hopes of reviving him.127
Solomon was well-liked as well but chose to keep a certain distance from his men. One
of the men recalled later that "Col. Van Rensselaer kept the troops every day at close drill and
field duty, he was constantly among them. Some of the suspected officers discovered that his
eagle eye was upon them; he was generally feared and loved; and it was owing to his unflinching
firmness that there was not a mutiny in camp, and the militia did not disband themselves and go
home...."128 John Lovett wrote that "Those who know Solomon Van Rensselaer in civil life,
know but very little about him. He is all formed for war; the whole economy of the camp is to
him familiar as Pot-boiling."129
The fact that the Van Rensselaers were respected and liked by their men is a testament to
how skilled the cousins were in politics. However, as mentioned in chapter 2, they struggled to
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keep the militia soldiers in line, including his junior officers. Quartermaster General Peter B.
Porter did not trust Stephen because of his Federalist leanings and, with supply problems
mounting, accused the general of being a traitor. Rumors began to swirl around camp, charging
that: "General Van Rensselaer [was] a traitor to his country, and the surrender of his army when
it crosses the river [would be] the price of his infamy."130 The younger Van Rensselaer was
outraged. He smeared Porter claiming that he was causing: "confusion and distrust among the
troops." Porter was incensed at the accusation and demanded satisfaction in the form of a duel on
Grand Island. Stephen threatened to have the two men arrested. Solomon then blamed Porter for
informing the Major General of the dispute. If Porter did not apologize, Solomon would declare
that Porter was: "a poltroon, a coward and a scoundrel." Porter said nothing remorseful to
Solomon. He then did as he promised, publishing his slanderous comments about Porter the
following winter in the newspapers.131
As the months dragged on, General Van Rensselaer was feeling pressure from all sides.
The amount of correspondence between him, General Dearborn, and Governor Tompkins, must
have been overwhelming for the man who had to prevent his officers from killing one another.
In a letter to Governor Tompkins dated September 17, he reassured the general of his position.
Despite his small force, Van Rennsalaer was prepared to hold his position and reassured the
governor that: "the disaster that has befallen the men at Detroit" would not affect his command.
He claimed that: "a stigma after the National Chronical which time could not wipe away" should
be "stamped" on the Detroit.132
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By October, the pressure was beginning to mount on Stephan Van Rensselaer to act. He
summoned war councils to plan for an attack, but the only men attending were soldiers from
Lewiston and Fort Niagara. General Alexander Smyth at Black Rock did not reply or attend.
Nor did Major General Amos Hall, the militia commander in Black Rock, or Nicholas Gray, an
advisor to Governor Tompkins. Except for Smyth, all the men had been in the region since the
summer. They knew the situation better than Van Rensselaer's other subordinates, which was
problematic, mainly because the war council had devised a two-pronged attack that would
require cooperation across the region. It called for a diversionary attack against Queenston
Heights while regulars landed at Newark (modern Niagara-On-The-Lake) and seized Fort
George.133
On October 8, the British ships Caledonia and Detroit were captured, along with 50
British soldiers were captured in a daring night raid. The action resulted in only 9 Americans
killed and the Detroit being scuttled.134 The incident drove Van Rensselaer to act in haste, and he
planned for an attack to occur on October 11. However, the attack failed to get off the ground.
Companies across the region began to move into position for the assault. Unfortunately, some
became lost in the storm that occurred that night. The "torrents of freezing cold" caused the
roads to become muddy, which caused Fenwick's men to take hours to reach their embarkation
point. Confusion and an unverified story of a missing boat that somehow had all the oars for the
other boats caused delays that led to the assault being canceled. The exhausted, cold, and wet
American troops trudged back to their camps, disappointed in the outcome. The British, who
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were none the wiser until daylight came, were now aware that the Americans were planning an
imminent attack.135
Going against military convention, General Van Rensselaer planned for another attack on
October 13. He was being pressured from all sides who wanted immediate action and did not
take time to consider potential consequences, including the possibility the British had been made
aware of American troop movements. The British were aware. General Isaac Brock and his staff
had arrived at Queenston Heights that night and received word that major troop movements
appeared to be the preparations for an attack. The attack had not come, however. Brock wrote
in dispatches that: "an attack is not far distant." 136 While the Americans would not have known
the British were aware, the Niagara River was only about 1,000 yards in width at the crossing.
From an experienced officer's perspective, British sentries would have most likely seen and
potentially heard the movements at night.137
Smyth, who initially participated in the attempt on the 11th, refused to participate until
his men were resupplied and rested.138 Van Rensselaer's plan was almost identical to his plan on
October 11. It called for thirty boats filled up with twenty men apiece. They were hoping to
catch the British by surprise by traveling under cover of night. Unfortunately, the Americans did
not have thirty boats. Instead, they only had thirteen.139 Lt. Colonel Solomon Van Rensselaer
was chosen to head the attack with Lt. Colonel John Chrystie of the 13th Infantry. Artillery
would support the invasion, which was to be commanded by Nicholas Gray and a young officer
from the 2nd Artillery named Lt. Colonel Winfield Scott. Scott was a promising officer who
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volunteered to fight in the engagement even though his superior, Alexander Smyth, was sitting
out the action. 140
The disastrous battle of Queenston Heights began at 2 AM. officers of the 13th infantry
were called together and told they would storm Queenston Heights. Specifically, they were told
to take the battery above the river. By 3 AM, 300 regulars had boarded the boats and had begun
crossing the Niagara River with artillery support. However, the surprise element was lost as a
British officer noticed their crossing and sounded the alarm.141 Amid the early stages of the
battle, Solomon Van Rensselaer, who had been sent to take direct command of the landing force,
was seriously wounded. He took two shots in the thigh and one through the leg and could not
continue in action. A regular army officer from the 13th, John E. Wool, took command and
managed to fight their way up the cliff's side and take the gun battery.142
The loss of Solomon Van Rennsalaer, General Van Rensselaer's most trusted advisor,
was a significant blow to operations. However, it was only one of the problems plaguing the
invading Americans. General Van Rensselaer's officers had failed to consider that the Niagara
River had a stiff current. As a result, numbers of boats were swept downriver and landed at a
point known as Hamilton Cove. This disaster cost time and almost the life of Lt. Colonels John
Chrystie and John R. Fenwick. Chrystie was shot in the hand before managing to turn the boat
around while Fenwick disembarked at the cove. He was: "clothed with bullets…One in his eyeone in his right elbow-one in his side…nine ball holes in his little cloak." British troops captured
Fenwick and other American troops at Hamilton Cove.143
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Brock was killed trying to retake the heights above Queenston at some point in the
fighting, causing the British to fall back.144 By 9 AM, the British had abandoned the village.
The river was clear for the Americans to cross unmolested. However, the shortage of boats,
many of them destroyed in action earlier in the morning, continued to slow the invasion.
Americans began plundering the town and had control of the hill overlooking it.145 A lull had
fallen on the battlefield.
The lull allowed the Americans time to fortify the heights, but no one was prepared to do
so. However, the real problem that had emerged was a complete breakdown in communication
at headquarters. General William Wadsworth, another inexperienced militia commander,
assumed command of American forces on Queenston Heights. However, when John Chrystie
returned to General Van Rensselaer to provide an update, he was told that Scott had offered to
take command while his artillery regiment stayed behind. Also, there were no more
reinforcements available. As noted in Chapter 2, the militia had refused to cross, leaving the
American regulars unsupported. Despite having the advantage of the high ground, they were
also running low on ammunition. The Americans were also now attacked by Grand River
Warriors, who were taking potshots at the Americans trying to dig in after Scott pushed back an
assault.146
With Scott now in command and resolving the command issue, The Americans waited
for what they assumed would be a British counteroffensive. At 3 PM, the attack came. British
General Roger Hale Sheaffe, Brock's second in command, assaulted the exhausted Americans.
Scott tried what he could to encourage his men, but the Americans were broken. Many
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Americans tried to escape what they feared would be a gruesome death and flung themselves
from the cliffs or tried to swim across the river only to drown. One soldier said: "I thought hell
had broken loose and let her dogs of war upon us."147
Sheaffe's counterattack was decisive. Two American officers approached the British line
to surrender, but Sheaffe had a rough time stopping the attack. His men were furious at the death
of Brock and were taking the opportunity to avenge him. They had been shouting: "Revenge the
General" as they overran the American position. By 4 PM, the attack was over, and Sheaffe
managed to end his men's onslaught.148 In the aftermath, Sheaffe sent a dispatch to Van
Rensselaer, and the two men decided on a ceasefire and the discussion of terms. Surgeons and
the personal baggage of officers were exchanged. Sheaffe offered to exchange the wounded and
explained to prisoners on parole that they could not serve again until regularly exchanged.149
The battle disgraced Van Rensselaer. Dearborn was furious upon hearing the news and
wrote a scathing letter, calling him: "an ignorant militia officer jealous of the regular service."
Van Rensselaer resigned his command, and his offer was quickly accepted.150 Van Rensselaer's
inexperience ruined him. Also, his dithering attitude at the beginning of his campaign caused
him, after some pressure, to rush into combat without adequate planning or considering
significant items, such as the current of the Niagara River, and attempting two attacks with just a
few days of each other. It was a lesson hard learned.

147

Pierre Berton, The Invasion of Canada: Volume One: 1812-1813 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1980),
248: Dzurec, 211
148
Langguth, 217.
149
Roger Hale Sheaffe, manuscript letter to Stephen Van Rensselaer, 13 October 1812, A. Conger Goodyear
Collection, War of 1812 Manuscripts, 1779-1862, Mss. B00-11, Box 1, Folder 2. Buffalo & Erie County History
Museum.
150
Jacques W. Redway “General Van Rensselaer and the Niagara Frontier” Proceedings of the New York State
Historical Association vol. 8 (1909), 20.

16
While Van Rennsalaer could be described as an amateur, he was not a victim of hubris or
the grandeur of his ego. That distinction falls to Alexander Smyth. On October 24, After Van
Rennsalaer's resignation, Alexander Smyth was given command of his predecessor's men's
remnants along with his own. His men were poorly trained, and their morale was low.151
Smyth was ambitious and tried to rally his troops in a bombastic proclamation.
Underlining words and writing in bold print, Smyth wrote the proclamation on November 17.
Smyth first addressed his regulars and claimed the men were "amply prepared for war" and
implied that the British soldiers were sickly from service in the West Indies. He also said that
the native allies in British service should not be feared but held "…in the utmost contempt." He
then turned to his militia and tried to appeal to their patriotism, writing in bold, all capital letters:
"You made sacrifices on the altar of your country." He wrote, "You will shun the eternal infamy
that awaits the man, who having come within sight of the enemy, basely shrinks in the moment
of trial." He then turned his attention to all men in arms, pushing them toward glory and reward,
almost as if Smyth was addressing a legion of Rome. He referred to them as "heroes" and stated
they would "vanquish a valiant foe" and that the rallying cry should be "The cannon lost at
Detroit-or death."152
While the proclamation was well-intended and projected a colorful concept of glory in
battle, the entire proclamation was also tone-deaf. As noted in Chapter One, Smyth's men were
improperly clothed, lacked food and adequate shelter. On top of that, his militia was mutinous.
He polled his men, and the militia refused to cross into Canada despite the promises of honor and
glory.153 His words would come back to haunt him.
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Smyth planned to land his men south of Niagara Falls near Fort Erie. He chose a landing
site between the fort and the town of Chippewa. Since the defeat at Queenston Heights, General
Sheaffe and the Americans had negotiated a brief armistice, which Smyth decided to terminate
on November 19. Under the armistice, 30 hours' notice was required before hostilities could
officially begin. Rather than send a letter to General Sheaffe at Fort George, he instead told the
commander at Fort Erie of his intentions to restart hostilities, hoping to catch the British off
guard and depriving them of reinforcements, which would come from 36 miles away at Fort
George.154
On November 21, an artillery duel began between Fort George and Fort Niagara that
lasted for over a day and could be heard as far away as Buffalo, signaling the end of the required
30-hour notice. Smyth moved his army to Black Rock's navy yard, and on November 28, he
launched his attack. Several detachments landed on the opposite side of the river led by Lt. Col.
Charles G. Boerstler from the 14th Regiment of Infantry. His men successfully destroyed a
bridge at Frenchman's Creek to prevent reinforcements from reaching Col. William H. Winder's
men. Winder was also from the 14th regiment, but he had detachments of the 12th, 13th, and 15th
under his command.155 His men were supposed to capture British artillery batteries. When
British scouts spotted Boerstler’s men, they informed their superiors, who began to open fire on
American boats crossing the river. As the battle grew in intensity, the bombastic general who
had previously told his regulars that they would "vanquish a valiant foe" was suddenly
indecisive. With half of Winder's men in the river, Smyth ordered about 1,200 men to disembark
and go to dinner while he held a council of war to discuss what to do next.
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Meanwhile, Winder's men took the batteries and drove the enemy from the field.
However, they were forced to retreat. The British took prisoners in their counterattack as some
men were left behind due to a lack of boats. Smyth issued a request to the commander at Fort
Erie to surrender, but he refused. 156 Thus, Smyth's first invasion attempt ended in disaster.
The second attempt occurred on November 30. British troops were surprised to see the
Americans gathering up to launch another invasion. Smyth was not present. Instead, he had his
subordinates make all the arrangements for the invasion. Soldiers sat in their boats for hours,
awaiting orders to depart. By the afternoon, Smyth finally appeared and ordered his men to
"Disembark and Dine." Angry and frustrated, some men visibly and pointedly destroyed their
muskets in protest. Smyth held a council of war and declared that "Neither rain, snow, or frost
will prevent the embarkation." The next morning, the men gathered in a nearby woods, but
Smyth again delayed after his staff convinced him that the third assault in daylight on the same
position in as many days was foolhardy.157
A fourth plan was for the army to land at Chippewa and march north to attack Fort
George. Exhausted, the soldiers again tried to climb into boats in the early morning hours with
the intent to float down the river to the new landing point. Hours passed, and more mutinies
occurred. Smyth had yet another council of war and decided to abandon the entire operation
claiming he did not have enough men. Smyth sent a letter to the soldiers ordering them to
disembark, which infuriated Peter B. Porter out in the Niagara River. Porter was understandably
livid. He smeared Smyth in the Buffalo Gazette as a traitor, which prompted a duel on Grand
Island. Both men came out unharmed from the incident, yet Smyth, now fearful that the
mutinous men and officers would turn on him, fled the camp and requested permission from
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General Dearborn to take a leave of absence. The request was granted, and he was dropped from
the roles and never returned to service.158
Smyth proved to be nothing more than a politician in an army uniform. He was unable to
stick to a plan that he, and his officers, had crafted. As a result, his army, and the campaign,
suffered. He was, arguably, the least effective commander the army had in the 1812 campaign
season. Governor Tompkins said: "Believing that there was some courage and virtue left in the
world, I did not, indeed could not, anticipate such a scene of gasconading and of subsequent
imbecility and folly as Genl. Smith [sic] has exhibited. To compare the events of the recent
campaign with those of the of the days of the Revolution, is almost enough to convince one, that
the race of brave men and able commanders will before many years become extinct."159
The top American commanders' ineptitude in the first year of the war helped complete
the US’ overall failures. The officers' physical and mental drawbacks coupled with egos and
inexperience helped make already difficult problems even worse. Had the U.S. military picked
younger and more experienced officers to lead in the field, the outcomes may have differed.
However, the military was restricted to the officers they had rather than the officers they needed.
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Conclusion
The United States military ended the first year of the War of 1812 in miserable failure.
They did not achieve any significant successes in the field, and all four attempts to invade
Canada failed to capture and hold territory. The next two years would see the American war
machine improve, but the war would end as status quo antebellum. The United States army had
failed to achieve its war aims in the first year of the war because of the convoluted supply
system, the militias' inadequacies, and the commanding generals' incompetence.
The supply system remained unchanged throughout the rest of the war. The army was
continually plagued with uniform and supply issues. As noted in Chapter 1, American arsenals
lacked weapons to supply the army at the end of the campaigning season in 1814. The supply
system was completely abandoned in 1818 in favor of a more improved system.160
The militia system's weakness continued to be demonstrated throughout the war and
caused the "myth" that it was a primary defense force had ended. The Army Reduction Act of
1815 relegated the militia to a secondary role in the national defense. The militia continued to be
neglected long after the War of 1812. States failed to submit militia returns as they did before the
war. Attempts were made for compelling state returns, but nothing was formally done. Fines
were gradually reduced for nonattendance, and despite the reductions in 1821, the militia as a
fighting force was increasingly suffering a decline in public support. During the Mexican War,
militias comprised only 12% of the U.S. Army. The Civil War saw militia used early on but were
ultimately turned into professional armies. However, the Militia Act of 1792 remained
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unchanged until Congress completely overhauled the system in 1903 and thus created the
National Guard. 161
The commanding officers in the United States Army failed to lead their men adequately
in battle. Despite some of them, such as Van Rennsalier, being able to command some respect of
their soldiers, they failed to achieve victory or make adequate gains. This failure cost all but one
of their commands and ruined their military careers. Henry Dearborn would stay in command,
despite the Secretary of War resigned. Hull, Van Rennsalier and Smyth never held command
again.
The first year of the War of 1812 was a dismal failure. The United States had failed to
make any meaningful gains except for loss, embarrassment, and death. The United States
overconfidently entered into the conflict expecting to march into British North America and
liberate the countryside. However, they did nothing, but fumble and the prospect going forward
looked grim. The lessons of the first year reverberated throughout the rest of the war and can be
taken into account by modern military strategists and history students.
In a strange irony, the only success during the first year was on the seas. The
underfunded US Navy delivered several victories that shocked the British public and caused
panic in London. While William Hull surrendered at Detroit, his nephew, Isaac Hull, captain of
the frigate Constitution, defeated the British frigate Guerrier, which provided a significant lift to
a demoralized United States public and shocked Admirals in London.162 The contrast was so
broad that Madison wanted the army to step up but realized the sobering reality going forward.
He stated in his second inaugural address, “Already we have the gallant exploits of our naval
heroes proved to the world our inherent capacity to maintain our rights on one element. If the
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reputation of our arms has been thrown under clouds on the other, presaging flashes of heroric
enterprise assure us that nothing is wanting to correspondent triumphs there also, but the
discipline and habits which are daily progress.”163
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